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Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook
Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems:
Where Do We Go From Here?
DILLON SWENSEN†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited
and Maximillian Schrems (Schrems II)1, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) ruled that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework (the
Framework), which permitted the transfers of EU citizens’ personal
data to the United States, was invalid.2 Finding that United States law
was insufficient to adequately protect the fundamental privacy rights
of its citizens3 and provide rights “essentially equivalent” to those that
European citizens had in their home countries, the ECJ struck down
the Framework and also called into question the adequacy of EU-U.S.
data transfers based on the primary alternative data transfer
mechanism: the Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs).4 The Schrems
II decision upheld the principles of the prior Schrems I decision, which
© 2021 Dillon Swensen.
† J.D. Candidate (2022), University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author thanks Alison DeMarco, Edward Bellows, Erick Marquina, and the Executive Board
of the Maryland Journal of International Law for their feedback, edits, and comments. He also
thanks Professor Markus Rauschecker for his guidance and advice throughout the writing
process. The author dedicates this article to his mother, Susan Swensen for her love and moral
support.
1. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 2020 EU:C:2020:559
(July 16, 2020) [hereinafter “Schrems II”].
2. See infra Part III.5.
3. In large part, these findings were based on the existence of mass surveillance
programs such as PRISM, which the court did not believe were sufficiently accountable. See
infra Part II.B, III.B.5
4. The Standard Contractual Clauses are boilerplate language inserted into contracts
between data providers, designed to create binding obligations on data providers to protect
privacy. See infra Part II.C, Part III.4–5.
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created the essential equivalence standard used by the ECJ in Schrems
II.5 Thus, when viewed in light of the fundamental importance of data
privacy as enshrined in EU law, this ruling was perhaps inevitable.6
In the wake of the Schrems II ruling, it is evident that any future
Framework would likely be equally invalid absent a substantial
overhaul of U.S. privacy law.7 This poses a nearly impossible barrier
to any future attempt to build a new version of the Framework that
could survive judicial review by the ECJ.8 There will be no easy
options available for businesses seeking to ensure compliance with EU
data protections and avoid strict fines.9 With the validity of many
transatlantic SCCs called into question and conflicting statements as to
their validity from the U.S. Government and various European
authorities, it is unclear what path remains for companies seeking to
comply with EU law and engage in international electronic data
commerce.10 It may be that the only viable long-term solution is for the
U.S. to pass legislation to bring its data privacy laws up to the essential
adequacy standard.11 Given the potential for large fines for companies
that fail to comply with EU law, the safest option for any company is
to keep EU citizens’ data within Europe.12 However, this may not be
economically feasible.13 The ECJ has created an extremely uncertain
business environment for multinational corporations seeking to do
business in Europe, a fact made clear by the comments from European
Data Authorities seeking to make sense of the ECJ’s ruling.14
This note was written during a time of remarkable uncertainty for
the future of transatlantic data transfer.15 While there is a significant
body of scholarship analyzing the Schrems I decision,16 the Schrems II
decision to date has been discussed primarily by journalists and the
reactions of government bodies.17 Accordingly, the intent of this note
is to provide an early assessment of the impact of the Schrems II

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
The research in this note is current as of December 21, 2020.
See e.g., infra notes 25, 30, 42.
See e.g., infra notes 153, 165, 168, 171.
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decision.18 More specifically, this note will provide an overview of the
legal and procedural background that informs the Schrems II decision
and will review the decision itself within the context of the prior
litigation on this topic.19 Next, this note will analyze the revolutionary
nature of the Schrems II opinion, discussing the role of the ECJ as a
safeguard for the fundamental rights of its citizens unbeholden to
corporate or political interests.20 Because the ECJ’s concerns with
Privacy Shield go beyond the document itself and take issue with the
foundations of the United States’ constitution and security apparatus,
this note will also discuss the degree to which competing values and
partisan deadlock within the United States make a replacement
Framework impossible, despite proclamations by the Department of
Commerce to the contrary.21 Finally, this note will provide a brief
analysis of the legal uncertainty that predominates after the Schrems II
ruling, with a particular focus on the conflicting statements of the
various national and regional European Data Protection Authorities
and the implications of these statements for companies seeking to
engage in EU-U.S. data transfers.22
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Commission Decision 2000/520 and the Development of
Safe Harbor

Under the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (“the
Directive”), EU member states were only allowed to permit the
transfer of personal data to countries outside the EU if, and only if, said
outside county “ensure[d] an adequate level of protection” for the
data.23 Article 25(6) of the Directive provided that the European
Commission may make a finding that a [non-EU] country ensures an
adequate level of protection either (1) “by reason of its domestic law”
18. While this paper does discuss the impact of the Schrems II decision on corporations
to some degree, detailed information on specific corporate responses largely falls outside of
its scope. For an example of a corporate response, consider: Rian van der Merwe, Postmark’s
Response to
the Schrems
II
Judgment, POSTMARK
(Dec.
8, 2020),
https://postmarkapp.com/blog/postmarks-response-to-the-schrems-ii-judgment-privacyshield-invalidation.
19. See infra Part II, III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part IV.B.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) art. 25(1) [hereinafter EU Data Protection
Directive 95/46].

5_SWENSEN VOL. 36_24 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

DATA PROT. COMM’R V. FACEBOOK IRELAND

1/24/2022 7:04 PM

27

or (2) “the international commitments it has entered into.”24 Without
such a finding, the personal data of EU citizens could not be
transmitted out of the EU.25
In order to ensure that EU-U.S. data transfers were legally
permissible, the European Commission and the U.S. Department of
Commerce negotiated the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.26 Under the
Safe Harbor Principles, companies were required to certify compliance
with the principles and publicize their adherence to the framework.27
This requirement that companies publicize their adherence ensured
that domestic U.S. regulatory agencies such as the FTC and state
attorney generals could bring claims against companies who breached
these public commitments on the basis of “unfair or deceptive” trade
practices.28
A mere five days after the issuance of the Safe Harbor Principles,
the EU Commission found that the Safe Harbor Principles provided
“an adequate level of protection for personal data” transferred from the
EU to organizations in the United States.29 The Commission’s finding
of adequacy was based on the Safe Harbor’s inclusion of dispute
resolution provisions and the commitment of the FTC to regulate
violations of the Safe Harbor Principles.30 This enforcement provision
was not entirely toothless either—over the next few years, the FTC
brought cases against companies including Google, Facebook, and
MySpace for violations of the Safe Harbor Principles.31 These
enforcement actions were not based on the Safe Harbor Principles
themselves, but rather on the violation of the public commitments,
which the FTC contended amounted to deceptive practices under U.S.

24. Id. at art. 25(6).
25. Id. at art. 25(1).
26. Gabe Maldoff & Omer Tene, “Essential Equivalence” and European Adequacy After
Schrems: The Canadian Example, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 211, 223 (2016).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 222–24.
29. Commission Decision 2000/520, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1 (EC).
30. Id.
31. Holly Kathleen Hall, Restoring Dignity and Harmony to United States–European
Union Data Protection Regulation, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 125, 129 (2018); Maldoff, supra
note 26, at 224; MySpace LLC, Docket No. C-4369 (Sept. 9, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/09/120911myspacecmpt.pdf;
Facebook,
Inc.
Docket
No.
C-4365
(Nov.
11,
2011)
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/11/111129facebookcmpt.pdf;
Google,
Inc.,
Docket
No.
C-4336
(Nov.
10,
2011)
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf
.
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law.32
Notably, the Safe Harbor Principles contained a carve-out
allowing states unlimited access to data for national security
purposes.33 Some have suggested that this lack of limitations was
because, at the time, few if any policymakers were aware of the scope
of warrantless government surveillance.34
B.

The Schrems I Decision and the End of Safe Harbor

In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor, leaked
information to the Guardian and the Washington Post detailing the
extensive data collection efforts of U.S. surveillance agencies.35 One
of the most notable of these efforts was PRISM, a government program
which gave the NSA direct access to major U.S. internet service
providers, including Facebook and Google.36 When contacted for
comment, these providers denied the allegations.37 Later revelations
from Snowden expanded upon this picture of a vast and unaccountable
surveillance architecture, including the capacity of the NSA to gather
information directly from fiberoptic cables (a process known as
upstream data collection).38
Shortly thereafter, Maximillian Schrems filed a complaint with
the Irish Data Protection Commissioner alleging that the Safe Harbor
framework, as implemented, was incompatible with EU law.39
Schrems had previously worked as a privacy advocate filing
complaints against Facebook to challenge the website’s privacy
policies, but in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations, Schrems
filed yet another complaint, inquiring whether Facebook was
voluntarily forwarding his personal data to the NSA.40 However, these
32. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 224.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 227.
35. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 225 (citing Glenn Greenwald, et al., Edward Snowden: the
Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013,
9:00
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsawhistleblower-surveillance).
36. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 226 (citing Dominic Rush & James Ball, PRISM Scandal:
Tech Giants Flatly Deny Allowing NSA Direct Access to Servers, THE GUARDIAN (June 6,
2013, 19:48), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsadata-mining).
37. Dominic Rush & James Ball, PRISM Scandal: Tech Giants Flatly Deny Allowing
NSA
Direct
Access
to
Servers, THE
GUARDIAN (June
6,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsa-data-mining.
38. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 226.
39. Id. at 228–30.
40. Id.
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complaints were dismissed as “frivolous and vexatious” by the
Commissioner.41 Schrems sought judicial review of this decision from
the Irish High Court.42 Although the High Court expressed concern
with the protections granted to EU citizens under the law, it did not
have the authority to make a ruling on a matter of EU law.43 Irish
privacy laws were preempted by the adequacy finding of the European
Commission.44 Accordingly, the High Court referred the matter to the
ECJ.45
This referral led to the famous Schrems I decision, where the ECJ
held that Decision 2000/520 was invalid and the “adequate level of
protection” standard under the Directive could only be satisfied by a
level of protection of its citizens’ fundamental privacy rights that was
“essentially equivalent” to the level of protection guaranteed within the
EU.46 Decision 2000/520, the Court held, could not be valid because it
did not account for domestic U.S. surveillance laws in its finding of
adequacy.47 Although national security was a “legitimate objective”
which could potentially justify an intrusion on the data privacy rights
of EU citizens, neither the Safe Harbor Framework nor any other
domestic law or international commitment of the U.S. placed any
limitations on this surveillance.48 Because Decision 2000/520 did not
account for this lack of limitations, the Court struck down the
Decision, invalidating the Safe Harbor framework as a mechanism for
data transfer.49
C.

The Privacy Shield Framework and the Development of the
GDPR

The reaction by various American-based tech businesses
operating in the EU was perhaps predictable.50 Even as soon as the
41. Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r [2014] IEHC 310 (Ir.), ¶ 32.
42. Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r [2014] IEHC 310 (Ir.).
43. Dr. Nora Ni Loidean, The End of Safe Harbor: Implications for EU Digital Privacy
and Data Protection Law, 19 J. INTERNET L. 1, 9–10 (2016) (citing Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt
Lübeck-Ost, Case C-314/85, ECR 4199 (1987)).
44. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 229.
45. Hall, supra note 31, at 132.
46. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015)
(“Schrems I”) at 73.
47. Id. at 98.
48. Id. at 88.
49. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 230.
50. See, e.g., Ben Kepes, How Tech Vendors Are Reacting to the Safe Harbor Ruling,
NETWORKWORLD (Oct. 19, 2015), www.networkworld.com/article/2991752/how-techvendors-are-reacting-to-the-safe-harbor-ruling.html;
Safe Harbour: Tech Firms Shudder As Watchdogs Meet, BBC (Feb. 2, 2016),
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Advocate General gave his preliminary, non-binding opinion, tech
executives stepped forward to criticize the direction of the ECJ. 51
Google and other companies were forced to scramble to determine
alternative measures, with Google announcing to its cloud platform
users that it would adopt a contractual clause based protection until a
new Safe Harbor agreement could be ratified.52
The European Commission and the U.S. Department of
Commerce moved quickly, and within four months of the Schrems I
decision, the European Commission and the U.S. Department of
Commerce announced a replacement framework, the “EU-U.S.
Privacy Shield.”53 Broadly speaking, the Privacy Shield agreement did
not differ much from Safe Harbor, although it did grant EU citizens
additional rights to access their private data and made clear that data
subjects had legal claims against data owners who failed to meet the
requirements of Privacy Shield (although there was no clear
enforcement mechanism in U.S. courts).54 Of particular note, the
Privacy Shield agreement created a “Privacy Shield Ombudsperson”
vested with the authority to investigate complaints made by EU
residents.55 This was combined with assurances from “high level US
officials” who provided assurances of the limitations on U.S.
surveillance, although it was unclear if these assurances merely
repeated existing, post USA Freedom Act policy.56
Bearing in mind the requirements of Schrems I, the Commission
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35460131.
51. See Sam Schechner & Natalia Drozdiak, U.S.–EU Data-Transfer Pact Should Be
Invalidated, Says Advocate General, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 23, 2015, 12:09
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-eu-data-transfer-pact-should-be-invalidated-saysadvocate-general-1442998520.
52. Hall, supra note 31, at 135.
53. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 236; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, EU Comm’n and U.S.
Agree on New Framework for Transatlantic Data Flows: EU–U.S. Privacy Shield (Feb. 2,
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.html.
54. See Owen, Comparison Safe Harbor vs. the EU–US Privacy Shield, OTAVA (Apr. 11,
2019),
https://www.otava.com/reference/how-does-safe-harbor-compare-to-the-eu-usprivacy-shield/ (noting that little had changed between Privacy Shield and Safe Harbor besides
the fact that companies could not transfer data on to a third party without consent). But see
David Zetoony, A Side-by-Side Comparison of “Privacy Shield” and the “Safe Harbor” (July
16, 2019), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Comparison-of-Privacy-Shield-andthe-Safe-Harbor.pdf (identifying several major changes including increased rights of data
subjects to access their private data and expanded legal recourse for said subjects).
55. Commission Implementing Decision 216/1250 of July 12, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L 207)
71.
56. Maldoff, supra note 26, at 238–39 (noting that the United States had passed further
legislation, including the USA Freedom Act, which limited NSA bulk metadata collection and
introduced new reporting requirements related to government data collection).
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Implementing Decision 2016/1250 formally approved the Privacy
Shield Agreement after “[careful analysis of] U.S. law and practice,
including [the United States’] official representations and
commitments.”57 The Commission noted that the Fourth Amendment
would indirectly protect EU citizens because their data would be stored
in the hands of U.S. corporations who could avail themselves of Fourth
Amendment protections.58 Although these protections did not apply
directly to EU citizens, the Commission noted that EU citizens could
avail themselves of certain statutory protections, such as the Freedom
of Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.59 The
Commission concluded that, based on this law and the assurances of
the U.S. government, the U.S. would limit its “interference” into the
“fundamental rights” of citizens whose personal data was transferred
out of the EU to “what was strictly necessary.”60 Finally, the
Commission committed to a regular review of the adequacy finding,
mindful that the level of protection provided by the U.S. could
change.61
On April 27, 2016 the European Parliament and Council of the
European Union repealed the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC)
and replaced it with the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”).62 The GDPR still invested the European Commission with
the power to determine whether nonmember countries offered
adequate levels of data protection.63 However, the GDPR affirmed the
“essential equivalence” standard of Schrems I.64 Of particular note was
the requirement that EU citizens needed to be granted “effective and
enforceable rights” and “effective administrative and judicial redress”
by the legal system of a nonmember state in order for a finding of
adequacy to be made by the Commission.65 Given the Commissioner’s
finding of inadequacy, the GDPR provided that the controllers or
57. See Commission Implementing Decision 216/1250 of July 12, 2016, 2016 O.J. (L
207) 12.
58. Id. at 126–27.
59. Id. at 130–34.
60. Id. at 135.
61. Id. at 145–46.
62. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 71 (explaining that for the purposes of the ECJ’s
analysis, the GDPR did not represent a fundamental shift in the law with regard to transfers of
personal data to nonmember states); see also infra Part III.B.
63. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 103
[hereinafter “GDPR”].
64. Id. at 104.
65. Id.
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processors of its citizens’ personal data should compensate for
inadequate data protection through one of two measures: standard
contractual clauses (SCCs) or binding corporate rules (BCRs) judged
by the Commission to offer adequate safeguards for data protection.66
The European Commission created SCCs in its 2010 SCC
Decision, which laid out a series of binding contractual clauses,67
which, when implemented without modification into the contract
between a EU-based data controller or processor and a non-EU-based
data controller or processor, were found to provide adequate data
protection.68 Although it was obvious that such SCCs were not capable
of binding the authorities of the non-EU country where the non-EU
data controller or data processor resided, because the authorities of that
country were not parties to the contract, the Commission stated that
they were nevertheless sufficient to meet the data protection standards
of the EU.69
BCRs70 were a similar type of data protection safeguard for
companies seeking to engage in data transfers.71 Unlike the SCCs,
BCRs were custom procedures developed and implemented by the data
controller themselves and then approved by the data protection
authorities and the European Data Protection Board.72 These BCRs
were held to be adequate protection for data so long as (1) they were
made legally binding, (2) were enforceable against and enforced by
every interested party involved in the data transfer, and (3) provided a
clear system for EU citizens to vindicate their data rights if necessary.73
66. Id. at 108.
67. For an example of the SCCs, please see: Annex, Commission Decision of 5 February
2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established
in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2016 O.J. (L 39) (Feb. 5, 2010).
68. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 124.
69. Id. at 125.
70. For an example of Binding Corporate Rules, please see: Privacy Rules for Customer,
Supplier and Business Partner Data, KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N.V. (2012),
https://www.philips.com/c-dam/corporate/about-philips/investor-relations/General-BusinessPhilips-PrivacyRulesCSBData.pdf.
71. Binding Corporate Rules (BCR), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (May 25, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-dataprotection/binding-corporate-rules-bcr_en; Working Document Setting Forth a Co-Operation
Procedure for the approval of “Binding Corporate Rules” for controllers and processors
under
the
GDPR,
EUR.
COMM’N
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=623056.
72. Binding Corporate Rules (BCR), supra note 71.
73. International Personal Data Transfers: Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs) Under the
GDPR, I-SCOOP (last visited Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.i-scoop.eu/gdpr/binding-corporaterules-bcrs-gdpr/.
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If these criteria were met, then the data controlling companies did not
need to rely on SCCs or Safe Harbor.74 The use of BCRs was
essentially limited to large companies that could afford to implement
them.75
Despite the difficulties of using BCRs, in the aftermath of
Schrems I, the ECJ had identified these two tools as a stopgap measure
that could be used until a new Safe Harbor provision was created. 76
Accordingly, in the aftermath of the Schrems I decision, many
companies, including Facebook, came to rely on the SCCs to ensure
their compliance with the law.77
III. DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER V. FACEBOOK IRELAND
LIMITED AND MAXIMILLIAN SCHREMS
A.

Procedural Background

After the October 2015 Schrems I decision and Facebook’s
adoption of the standard data protection clauses set out in the SCC
Decision, in December 2015 Schrems reformulated his Complaint to
the Data Protection Commissioner.78 Schrems argued that because
United States law required Facebook to make personal data transferred
to it available to American security agencies such as the NSA and FBI,
the SCC decision was insufficient to ensure the essentially equivalent
protections required under the Schrems I decision.79 In a draft decision,
the Commissioner agreed, stating that the SCCs were by their very

74. Id.
75. Nigel Cory, et al. ‘Schrems II’: What Invalidating the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Means
for Transatlantic Trade and Innovation, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (ITIF) (Dec. 3,
2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/12/03/schrems-ii-what-invalidating-eu-us-privacyshield-means-transatlantic (noting that even for such companies, BCRs were not a panacea,
being vulnerable to many of the same risks as SCCs). However, the difficulty in implementing
BCRs means that in 2018, only 132 companies had ever obtained an approved BCR.
Alexandra Ross & Volha Samsiuk, BCRs: ‘Best Case Route’ or ‘Better Call Reinforcements’?,
IAPP (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/bcrs-best-case-route-or-better-callreinforcements/.
76. Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the Transfer of Personal Data from the EU to the United States of America
under Directive 95/46/EC following the Judgment by the Court of Justice in Case C-362/14, at
5, EUR. COMM’N, COM (2015) 566 final (Nov. 11, 2015).
77. Natasha Lomas, Facebook Told it May Have to Suspend EU Data Transfers After
Schrems
II
Ruling,
TECHCRUNCH (TC) (Sept.
9,
2020,
5:20
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/09/09/facebook-told-it-may-have-to-suspend-eu-data-transfersafter-schrems-ii-ruling/.
78. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 53–55.
79. Id.
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nature incapable of binding the United States authorities.80 Given that
Schrems’ new complaint raised the issue of the validity of the SCC
decision, the Commissioner brought the action before the Irish High
Court, which in turn referred the question to the ECJ.81
Before referring the matter to the ECJ however, the Irish High
Court undertook an expansive examination of the facts at issue.82 The
High Court did not confine itself to an assessment of the question of
the validity of Facebook’s SCC, but conducted a broad review of the
United States governments’ intelligence activities and other grounds
for holding data transfers between the United States and European
Union to be invalid.83 In particular, the High Court focused on § 702
of FISA an Executive Order 12333.84
The High Court identified that the Attorney General of the United
States and the Director of National Intelligence had the authority under
§ 702 of FISA85 to approve surveillance of individuals other than
United States citizens who were located outside of the United States,
an authority which provided the basis for the PRISM and UPSTREAM
programs.86 Under PRISM, the Court found that internet service
providers were required to supply the NSA with all communications
to and from a selected individual.87 Under UPSTREAM, the court
found that the telecommunications providers were required to allow
the NSA to copy internet traffic in order to acquire communications to
and from non-U.S. citizens.88 Executive Order 12333 provided even
more expansive surveillance authority by authorizing the NSA to
access data transmitted to the United States via underwater cables in
the Atlantic.89
A primary concern of the High Court was the lack of significant
protections for non-U.S. citizens.90 Under U.S. law, the High Court
found that intelligence activities conducted against non-U.S. citizens
are limited only insomuch as they must be “as tailored as feasible.”91
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60–61.
Id.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2020).
Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63
Id. at 64.
Id.
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Furthermore, EU citizens lacked the judicial remedies available to U.S.
citizens, since they did not fall under the Fourth Amendment
protections.92 Even if such protections had been available to EU
citizens, the High Court noted that the NSA’s transatlantic cable
surveillance under E.O. 12333 was not subject to any judicial
oversight.93 In attempting to defend the SCCs, Facebook argued that
the Privacy Shield Framework, which the Commission had found to
provide adequate data protections for the data of EU citizens, was
binding on U.S. authorities such that even if the SCCs did not prevent
mass surveillance of EU citizens, the Privacy Shield Framework
would.94 However, the High Court expressed doubt, noting that the
Privacy Shield ombudsperson did not have sufficient judicial oversight
powers to “afford EU citizens a level of protection essentially
equivalent to that guaranteed by [EU law].”95
Accordingly, the Irish High Court stayed the proceedings and
referred a series of eleven questions to the ECJ.96 The ECJ reduced
these questions to a set of five core questions, which were:
(1) Does the processing of data for national security
purposes by a non-EU country remove that data from
the protections of the GDPR?97
(2) What level of protection does the GDPR require? 98
(3) If a data transfer does not comply with the
protections required by the GDPR, does that data
transfer have to be shut down?99
(4) Does the SCC decision ensure an adequate level of
data protection?100
(5) Does the United States, by virtue of its laws and
international commitments, ensure an adequate level of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68, 80.
Id. at 68, 90.
Id. at 68, 106.
Id. at 68, 122.
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data protection?101
B.

The Case

Prior to addressing these questions, the ECJ first needed to
address a series of admissibility challenges brought by Facebook
Ireland and the German and UK Governments.102 Facebook Ireland’s
objection was that the referral from the Irish High Court was based on
Directive 95/46, which after the referral had been repealed in favor of
the GDPR.103 Accordingly, Facebook Ireland argued the entire case
was inadmissible.104 However, the ECJ rejected this line of reasoning,
holding that for purposes of the case, the relevant portions of Directive
95/46 were effectively identical to those in the GDPR.105 The Court
further stated that it had a duty not merely to answer the Irish High
Court’s questions themselves, but to interpret all provisions of EU law
which the Irish High Court would need in order to decide the case,
whether explicitly mentioned in the referral questions or not.106
The German government and the UK government objected on the
grounds that the record of the case had not been sufficiently
developed.107 In response, the ECJ pointed to precedent which
indicated that national courts referring matters to the ECJ enjoy a
“presumption of relevance” and acknowledged that sufficient facts had
been presented by the Irish High Court to make a ruling on each
question.108 It was clear from the factual record that Facebook Ireland
did transfer data and that those transfers were made pursuant to the
standard data protection clauses in the SCC decision.109
1.

The First Question

After determining that the questions referred by the Irish High
Court were admissible, the ECJ proceeded to assess whether the GDPR
applied to data processed by third party countries acting in their
101. Id. at 68, 150. A complete listing of all questions can be found within the text of the
decision. Id. at 68.
102. Id. at 69.
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. (citing Case C-897/PPU, Ruska Federacija, 2020 EU:C:2020:262 at 43 (Apr. 2,
2020)).
107. Id. at 72. The German Government emphasized that it was unclear whether Schrems
had consented to the data transfers at issue, and the UK Government emphasized that since it
was unclear what data had been transferred, the entire case was purely a hypothetical one. Id.
108. Id. at 73-74.
109. Id.
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national security capacity.110 The ECJ confirmed that it did.111 Because
the GDPR expressly required the Commission, when making adequacy
decisions, to assess “relevant legislation . . . concerning public
security, defen[s]e, national security and criminal law and the access
of public authorities to personal data. . .”, the court held that the GDPR
still applied, even in cases where state security was implicated or
where data was processed by state security apparatuses.112
2.

The Second, Third, and Sixth Questions

In response to the Irish High Court’s inquiries regarding the level
of data protection required under the GDPR, the ECJ affirmed that an
“adequate level of protection” meant “a level of protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that
. . . under the European Union by virtue of the regulation[.]”113 In the
absence of a finding by the European data authorities that a third party
country provided an “adequate level of protection” i.e. the essential
equivalence standard established in Schrems I, the controller or
processer had to take “appropriate safeguards[.]”114 In order to take
“appropriate safeguards,” the controller or processor must be capable
of ensuring that their data protections provide the same protection in
the third party country as in the European Union.115 To determine what
level of protection was adequate, the ECJ assessed (1) the contractual
clauses (such as SCCs) binding the data controllers and processors in
the EU and outside of the EU, (2) the degree of access that third party
non-EU countries’ public authorities had to the data, (3) the legal
system of the third party country and (4) the specific remedies that
legal system provided to EU citizens.116
3.

The Eighth Question

Next, the court sought to identify the proper remedy in the event
that there was not a finding of essential equivalence.117 The Irish High
Court questioned whether Article 58(2)(f) of the GDPR required the
suspension of a data transfer to a third country if that third country
offered insufficient protections to EU citizen’s personal data.118
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 86-89.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96, 104.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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Although the ECJ recognized that individual supervisory authorities
had the discretion to determine what action was appropriate under
particular factual circumstances, supervisory authorities were
nonetheless required to “suspend or prohibit” transfers to non-EU
countries where either SCCs were not or could not be complied with,
or where “EU law cannot be ensured by other means.”119 Although the
court appeared to give some leeway to these supervisory authorities to
craft individual remedies, the ruling was nevertheless definitive in its
statement that data transfers that were not adequately protected by
SCCs or other law needed to be terminated.120
4.

The Seventh and Eleventh Questions

Having resolved that where data transfers performed under SCCs
did not provide adequate data protection, those data transfers must be
terminated, the Court next turned to whether the SCC decision itself
could ensure an adequate level of protection at all.121 It was undisputed
that SCCs did not and could not bind third party countries, who
theoretically were free to process data in ways that denied EU citizens
an adequate level of protection under EU law.122 Here, the Court stated
that while SCCs drawn up by the Commission theoretically could
provide an essentially equivalent level of protection, it was the
obligation of the controller or processor to provide adequate
safeguards, including “effective legal remedies” and “enforceable . . .
rights.”123
The Court, however, acknowledged that such adequate
safeguards might well be beyond the power of data controllers to
provide, since after all, public authorities were free to circumvent or
ignore those protections.124 Therefore, the Court suggested that it may
be necessary to “supplement” SCCs if said protections were
circumvented or ignored by public authorities in a non-EU country.125
However, the Court did not explain what these supplementary
measures might entail.126 The Court limited its analysis to concluding
that in the absence of effective supplementary measures, data transfers

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id.
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would need to be terminated.127 Each data controller established in the
EU seeking to transfer data out of the EU had an obligation, the Court
ruled, to verify the level of protection it could provide.128
5.

The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Questions

Lastly, the Court considered whether the Privacy Shield
Decision’s finding that the United States provided an adequate level of
protection was binding on the supervisory authority of member
states.129 Although Advocate General Øe had written a preliminary
opinion suggesting that the Court could rule without actually
addressing the United States or Privacy Shield, the Court declined to
follow this guidance.130 Because the controversy at issue was over the
validity of SCCs, Øe’s opinion had sidestepped the issue of Privacy
Shield entirely, perhaps out of a desire to avoid invalidating the entire
Privacy Shield Framework with potentially significant ramifications.131
However, the ECJ noted that Facebook Ireland had claimed in the
proceedings below that Privacy Shield was binding on data authorities
in Europe and therefore, those data authorities did not have the
authority to prohibit data transfers to the United States.132
Although the Court found that the Privacy Shield Decision was
binding, it nevertheless reviewed the Privacy Shield Decision to
determine whether it was valid.133 The Court found that the Privacy
Shield Decision was questionable in light of Section 702 of the FISA
and E.O. 12333.134 Because Section 702 of the FISA did not provide
any limitations on the U.S. Government’s power to implement
surveillance programs targeted at non-U.S. persons, the Privacy Shield
Decision, in order to be valid, would have to create an enforceable right
to legal redress for EU citizens under surveillance.135 For the ECJ, the
existence of an effective legal redress in the U.S. was of “particular
importance” in guaranteeing essential equivalence, and it was

127. Id. at 135 (noting, for example, where the laws of a third-party country rendered SCCs
inadequate and there was nothing that supplementary measures could do, the data transfer
could not go through).
128. Id. at 142.
129. Id. at 150.
130. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland, Ltd.,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe.
131. Id. at 6, 171–73.
132. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 153, 156.
133. Id. at 160.
134. Id. at 178.
135. Id. at 181–82.
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impossible to guarantee essential equivalence without it.136 The ECJ’s
concerns went to the heart of the U.S. legal system. In particular, the
ECJ raised concerns that without effective legislation permitting EU
citizens to access data relating to themselves and obtain the
“rectification or erasure” of that data when held by a third party,
adequacy standards could not be met.137 The Court particularly
emphasized the threat posed by E.O. 12333, which authorized broad
reaching surveillance with no hope of effective redress by EU
citizens.138
The Privacy Shield Ombudsperson under the Privacy Shield
Framework did nothing to allay the concerns of the ECJ.139 The Privacy
Shield Ombudsperson, the ECJ found, reported to the Secretary of
State and thus was not independent from the U.S. Executive, even if
they were ostensibly independent from the intelligence community.140
Furthermore, the Ombudsperson did not provide any real legal remedy
to EU citizens.141 In light of these facts, the ECJ ruled that the Privacy
Shield Decision was invalid just as it had previously struck down Safe
Harbor.142
VI. ANALYSIS
Having struck down the Privacy Shield Decision, the ECJ has
once again left U.S. based data controlling companies doing business
within the EU in a state of uncertainty. This section argues that
although companies and academics on the U.S. side of the Atlantic
expressed a degree of shock and consternation in response to the ECJ
decision,143 when viewed in the context of historical trends in EU
regulation, the ECJ was simply following the logical and inevitable
outcome of EU laws.144 Furthermore, when reviewing the history of
136. Id. at 189.
137. Id. at 187.
138. See, e.g., id. at 183.
139. Id. at 190.
140. Id. at 195.
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id. at 201.
143. See, e.g., Stewart Baker, The Cyberlaw Podcast: Trumping Schrems II, LAWFARE
(Nov. 3, 2020, 11:05 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyberlaw-podcast-trumpingschrems-ii (criticizing the Schrems II decision as “hypocritical European imperialism”);
Multi-Association Letter Responding to Schrems II, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (July 17, 2020),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/multiassociation_letter_responding_to_schrems_ii_july_17_2020.pdf (expressing concern over the
effects of the ECJ’s decision to strike down Privacy Shield).
144. See Infra Part IV.A.
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how the U.S. and the EU view data privacy, it becomes clear that there
is a fundamental incompatibility in outlook; one which has hamstrung
the past two attempts to reconcile EU and U.S. privacy law, first
through Safe Harbor and later the Privacy Shield Decision.145
Mechanisms such as the Privacy Shield’s Ombudsman fail to address
the fundamental differences in the two privacy regimes.146 If the U.S.
wants to maintain electronic data trade with the EU, without adopting
laws analogous to the GDPR as California has, Japan provides an
imitable model for future data privacy laws.147 However, this represents
a long-term solution.148 In the short term, this section argues that there
is no clear path forward; the confusing and highly varied responses of
the U.S. government and various European data protection agencies
indicate a lack of easy short-term answers for companies seeking to
maintain data transfers across the Atlantic.149
A.

The Schrems II Decision was not Extraordinary but
Inevitable

On a fundamental level, the Schrems II decision follows the
principles outlined by the ECJ in Schrems I and the principles outlined
in the GDPR. Schrems I created the essential equivalence standard and
the fundamental framework that underpinned the ECJ’s understanding
of essential equivalence.150 Much of the ECJ’s opinion was merely an
affirmance of these principles.151 Therefore, the decision of the ECJ in
Schrems II should be seen as the predictable and logical outcome. After
all, Privacy Shield did not represent a major deviation from Safe
Harbor in terms of the protections it offered.152 The underlying EU laws
had not fundamentally changed in the interim between Schrems I and
Schrems II, and the court utilized the same analytical framework—
essential equivalence—that it had utilized in Schrems I.153 Thus, in the
absence of any substantive change in the law or in the EU-U.S.
agreement, it is hard to imagine a different result. Despite the
consternation that the decision has generated among some parties in

145. See Infra Part IV.B.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Infra Part IV.C.
150. Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post
Schrems, 18 GERMAN L.J. 881, 899–900 (2017) (predicting in essence the process of
comparison of U.S. domestic law and EU law that the ECJ would undertake).
151. See supra Part III.
152. See supra Part II.
153. See supra Part III.B.2.
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United States,154 the Schrems II decision fits within a historical trend
of European data protection, a trend which reflects the importance of
data privacy to EU citizens.155
However, in the field of data privacy, the European regulatory
regime has historically been tempered by pragmatism: all parties
recognize that some mechanism for the legal transfer of personal data
is necessary, and that as valuable as the European data market is, it
would be extremely harmful to Europe to have to close its borders to
international, and specifically American, tech companies.156 Thus, after
the collapse of Safe Harbor, both sides rushed to create a new
agreement as quickly as possible.157 Privacy Shield was not merely a
benefit to American companies; numerous European firms relied on it
as well.158 Even now, the European Union and the U.S. government
have expressed mutual willingness to negotiate a new agreement.159
By contrast, the highest court in Europe appears to be acting out
of a different and more fundamental set of values—not the pragmatism
of the negotiators who have now drafted two sets of privacy
frameworks in the past decade, only for each to be struck down in
turn—but rather out of a concern for data privacy as a fundamental
value enshrined in EU law.160 The Schrems II decision could have been
much more cautious—indeed, the ECJ perhaps could have avoided
making a concrete ruling on the validity of the Privacy Shield
Framework, as shown by the Opinion of Advocate General Øe.161 The
154. This regulatory project has often been described in various hostile terms by U.S.
commenters – as “hypocritical European imperialism” or the like. See, e.g., Baker, supra note
143; Multi-Association Letter Responding to Schrems II, supra note 143.
155. European citizens remain highly concerned with the sharing of their personal data:
41% do not want to share “any personal data” with private companies. Your Rights Matter;
Data Protection and Privacy, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (FRA) (2020),
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2020/fundamental-rights-survey-data-protection.
156. EU-U.S. data transfers facilitate a transatlantic trade worth $7.1 trillion. EU-US
Privacy Shield for Data Struck Down by Court, BBC (July 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53418898.
157. Zoya Sheftalovich, 5 Takeaways from the Privacy Shield, POLITICO (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://www.politico.eu/article/privacy-shield-agreement-takeaways-text-released/
(“[T]he
Council’s biggest concern is how quickly the new arrangement can be up and running.”).
158. Cory, supra note 75.
159. Press Release, U.S. Department of Com., Com. Secretary Wilbur L. Ross at the U.S.Ireland Economic Forum Virtual Meeting (Oct. 22, 2020) (on file with U.S. Department of
Com.).
160. Cedric Ryngaert & Mistale Taylor, The GDPR as Global Data Protection
Regulation?, 114 AJIL UNBOUND 5, 7 (2020) (“[T]he [ECJ] has . . . strongly emphasized the
right to data protection over countervailing interests, such as security and the free flow of
information.”).
161. Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ireland, Ltd.,
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Advocate General’s Opinion completely avoided ruling on the Privacy
Shield framework and instead focused on the SCC actually used by
Facebook.162 Ostensibly, only the SCC was actually at issue in this
case, although the Irish High Court framed the issue more broadly.163
In answering all the questions at issue, the ECJ left itself no choice but
to strike down the Privacy Shield Framework.164
This decision, although widely accepted by the European Data
Protection Authorities,165 has also led to some concern. In an interview
commenting on the ECJ’s ruling, Stefan Brink, the BadenWürttemberg State Commissioner for Data Protection acknowledged
that if European nations were required to prevent personal data
transfers to the U.S., there would be significant economic harm to the
EU as well as the U.S.166 However, even in Schrems I, the ECJ clearly
indicated that its considerations were not based on economics or
pragmatism.167 The ECJ, following its own fundamental rights law,
established a stringent standard and it expected the Commissioner to
uphold that standard.168 U.S. companies are already experiencing the
ramifications of such a standard. In September 2020, the Irish Data
Commissioner reportedly instructed Facebook to stop data transfers to
the U.S.169
B.

The Incompatibility of the EU and U.S. Conceptions of
Data Privacy

The ECJ likely had no choice but to open Europe up to this
uncertainty and potential harm. At its core, the Schrems II decision
necessarily accepts the GDPR and European privacy law as it has been

ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe at 171–73.
162. Id. at 174–79.
163. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 68.
164. See Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, at 186, 308 (refusing to rule on the
issue of whether Privacy Shield provided essential equivalence, while acknowledging that if
the court did, it was probable that the finding of adequacy would be overturned).
165. See infra Part IV.C.
166. Der EuGH könnte seinen Hebel überschätzen [translated as “The ECJ Could
Overestimate its Leverage”], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (July 20, 2020),
https://zeitung.faz.net/faz/politik/2020-0720/22ea53d809ccc61cfe25da3e213e61e6/?GEPC=s3.
167. See Schrems I, 2015 EU:C:2015:650 at 32, 39.
168. See id. at 72–74.
169. Adrian Weckler, Irish Data Regulator Orders Facebook to Stop Sending Personal
Data
to
the
US,
INDEPENDENT.IE
(Sept.
9,
2020
at
10:36
PM),
https://www.independent.ie/business/technology/irish-data-regulator-orders-facebook-tostop-sending-personal-data-to-the-us-39518775.html.
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established.170 The real evaluative work of the decision is in its
assessment of U.S. privacy law, an assessment which it is admittedly
difficult for a foreign body to perform.171The ECJ’s opinion of U.S. law
may seem extreme; certainly, there has been no shortage of negative
commentary on the ECJ from U.S. observers.172 And certainly, the
current situation has created difficulties for companies seeking to
comply with EU data law and avoid what can be extremely steep
fines.173 However, the root of this decision comes from the
fundamentally and potentially irreconcilable views of the right to
privacy under U.S. and EU law.174
Under EU Law, the right to privacy is fundamental and generally
cannot be contracted away.175 The fundamental importance of privacy
is enshrined in both the EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) and
in its successor, the GDPR.176 EU policymakers traditionally favor
comprehensive legislation establishing private and public principles
for data privacy which are then enforced by data protection
authorities.177 For the EU “privacy is not only an individual right but
also a social value.”178 Data protection itself is a fundamental right.179
Although the EU recognizes that data protection interests must be
balanced against competing national security, human rights, and other
policy interests,180 there is an understanding within the EU that because
of the fundamental nature of the right to data protection, it has a nonnegotiable character.181 It is from this non-negotiable character that the
concept of essential equivalence springs – the EU (and thus the ECJ)
cannot abrogate its conception of data privacy for trade purposes.182
In comparison, the U.S. data privacy law is relatively restricted.
The origins of data privacy in the United States arise out of a common
law tradition which did not meaningfully recognize privacy as a
170. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 3–34.
171. Kuner, supra note 150, at 900.
172. Multi-Association Letter Responding to Schrems II, supra note 143.
173. GDPR, Art. 83 at 1–5.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 187–91.
175. EU Data Prot. Directive 95/46 at 10.
176. GDPR at 3–16.
177. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2012).
178. Data Protection, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/dataprotection_en (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Flora Y. Wang, Cooperative Data Privacy: The Japanese Model of Data Privacy and
the EU-Japan GDPR Adequacy Agreement, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 661, 668 (2020).
182. Id. at 670–71.
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right.183 The protection of privacy largely emerged out of the Fourth
Amendment over a series of Supreme Court rulings.184 This right was
always somewhat circumscribed: for example, in NASA v. Nelson, the
Supreme Court has suggested that there might be no right to
informational privacy.185 Further, the constitutional right to privacy
within the U.S. context applies primarily to state actions, and purely
private conduct is not protected.186 Data protection in the U.S. has
always relied upon a patchwork of federal and state laws, largely
designed to protect not consumer data generally, but rather certain
types of particularly sensitive data.187
Schrems I and Schrems II must be viewed in the context of these
two very different privacy regimes. America has taken a less strict
approach towards data protection, and one which, especially in the
context of national security, does not meet the EU standards.188 The
sprawling nature of U.S. surveillance, combined with the lack of
recourse for European data subjects, will likely make it impossible for
a new EU-U.S. Privacy Framework to replace the Privacy Shield
Framework.189 The absence of limitations on the power of the United
States surveillance apparatus to surveil “non-U.S. persons” was a
critical consideration of the ECJ and is one which cannot be addressed
without a change to U.S. law.190 The ECJ was unable to identify any
U.S. legislation that would provide effective judicial review of U.S.

183. Stephen Mulligan & Chris Linebaugh, Data Protection Law: An Overview, CONG.
RSCH. SERV. 3 (Mar. 25, 2019) (noting that “solitude was readily available in colonial
America” and that there were common law protections against eavesdropping and trespass,
but no protection of an individual right to privacy as such).
184. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (ruling that the Fourth
Amendment does not create a general right to privacy); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that an individual retains some expectation of privacy with regard
to cell phone site location information).
185. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 159 (2011).
186. Id. at 158.
187. Stephen Mulligan & Chris Linebaugh, Data Protection Law: An Overview, CONG.
RSCH. SERV. 3 (Mar. 25, 2019).
188. This is not to say, of course, that the EU does not restrict data privacy on the basis of
national security concerns; quite the contrary. GDPR at 16.
189. See Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 178. Although negotiations are underway to
replace the Privacy Shield Framework, these negotiations have been hampered by the recent
inauguration of President Biden due to changeover in personnel. Vincent Manancourt & Mark
Scott, Joe Biden Win Kicks US-EU Privacy Deal into the Long Grass, POLITICO (Nov. 10,
2020)
https://www.politico.eu/article/joe-biden-win-kicks-us-eu-privacy-deal-into-longgrass/. Also, President Biden and President Trump’s stances on privacy and national security
are not significantly different – a reflection perhaps of the gulf in policy between Europe and
America on this issue. Id.
190. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 178–85.

5_SWENSEN VOL. 36_24 (DO NOT DELETE)

46

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1/24/2022 7:04 PM

[Vol. 36:1

surveillance and bulk data collection.191 Therefore, in order to provide
essential equivalence between U.S. and EU data protection laws, the
United States would likely need to pass federal data privacy
legislation. At the bare minimum, this law would need to provide
enhanced protections for EU data subjects and effective redress for
those data subjects under U.S. law.192
In order to move past Schrems II and create a privacy regime that
is acceptable to the ECJ, one possible solution may be to look to
foreign models which have been accepted as essentially equivalent.193
Motivated by potential economic benefits, Japan has recently reformed
its own data privacy laws, creating a two track model which ensures
the protection of EU citizens’ personal data at a higher level than its
own domestic personal data.194 The Japanese Constitution, like the U.S.
Constitution, only implicitly recognizes the right to privacy.195
Although Japan has not historically been deeply concerned with data
privacy for its own citizens, the potential loss of access to European
markets motivated a bilateral agreement.196 In the future, Japan’s two
track approach may not be an isolated example: South Korea and India
are seeking similar agreements which would allow them to maintain
data trade with Europe.197 However, there are significant downsides to
such an approach: if the U.S. were to follow a similar path, it might
take several years of negotiations, and a deal modelled on the Japanese
would not provide protection for U.S. data subjects.198
A more sensible approach might be for the United States to move
towards a data privacy regime more closely aligned with the European
model.199 The CCPA replicates various provisions of the GDPR, albeit
191. Id. at 187–90.
192. Id. at 189.
193. Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419 of 23 January 2019 Pursuant to
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate
Protection of Personal Data by Japan Under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information,
2019 O.J. (L 76) 1 at 4.
194. Flora Y. Wang, Cooperative Data Privacy: The Japanese Model of Data Privacy and
the EU-Japan GDPR Adequacy Agreement, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 661, 689 (2020).
195. Id. at 669 (citing NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 13
(Japan)) (“All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare,
be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.”).
196. Id. at 667 (explaining that Japan’s decision was motivated by a desire to retain access
to EU markets and strengthen its own economy).
197. Id. at 672–73.
198. Id. at 671.
199. Dimitri Sirota, California’s new data privacy law brings U.S. closer to GDPR,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 14, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2019/11/14/californias-new-data-
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with a limited scope.200 However, at the national level, there are few
signs of any push towards a federal privacy bill. 201 There have only
been infrequent debates in the Senate on this issue to date, and the
current proposals fall significantly short of the GDPR.202 Thus, U.S.
based multinational companies attempting to comply with EU data law
will not be able to rely in the short term on a legislative remedy from
the U.S.
C.

Reactions to the Schrems II Decision – Where do we go
from here?

Schrems II did not provide substantial clarity on what affirmative
steps companies could take to ensure compliance with the essential
equivalence standard.203 Thus, interpreting what measures are
necessary has fallen to the European Data Protection Authorities, who
themselves have offered a wide range of conflicting and often unclear
advice.204 Generally, the European Data Protection Authorities have
expressed the need for some action or reassessment of current data
privacy safeguards.205 However, these responses still raise serious
questions for companies seeking to comply with the new system as to
what, if any, action is necessary.206 Certain authorities, such as the
privacy-law-brings-u-s-closer-to-gdpr/.
200. Laura Jehl & Alan Friel, CCPA and GDPR Comparison Chart, BAKER HOSTETLER,
LLP (2018), https://www.bakerlaw.com/webfiles/Privacy/2018/Articles/CCPA-GDPRChart.pdf.
201. Emily Birnbaum, Senators Inch Forward on Federal Privacy Bill, THE HILL (Dec. 4,
2019),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/473071-senators-inch-forward-on-federalprivacy-bill.
202. Christian Fjeld, Congressional Privacy Action – Part 1: The Senate, NAT’L L. REV.
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congressional-privacy-action-part-1senate; Mila Japser, Senate Still Divided on Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation,
NEXTGOV (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nextgov.com/analytics-data/2020/09/senate-stilldivided-comprehensive-data-privacy-legislation/168725/ (explaining that only one of the
proposed bills includes a private right of action, and the other proposed bill could actually
substantially reduce data privacy protections by preempting stricter state laws).
203. Schrems II, 2020 EU:C:2020:559 at 168–202.
204. See Data Transfers After Schrems II – the Response of Authorities, PINSENT MASONS
(Jan. 6 2021, 11:10 AM), https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/guides/schrems-ii-theresponse; Responses to the Decision in Case C-311/18 (Schrems II), PAUL HASTINGS,
www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/pdfs/2020_responses-to-privacyshield.pdf?sfvrsn=d1e7daaa_28 (last accessed Dec. 19, 2020). Many of these agencies have
provided what amount to neutral statements, merely summarizing the ruling of the ECJ
without offering substantial commentary or clarification with regard to the ruling.
205. Europe: Data Protection Authorities React to Schrems II Judgment, ONETRUST DATA
GUIDANCE (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.dataguidance.com/news/europe-data-protectionauthorities-react-schrems-ii.
206. Id; see also Data Transfers After Schrems II – the Response of Authorities, supra note
204; Responses to the Decision in Case C-311/18 (Schrems II), supra note 204.
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Baden-Württemberg State Commissioner for Data Protection, have
taken a hard line stance, stating that a data controller relying on an SCC
in the U.S. would certainly not be in compliance.207 Similarly, the
Berlin Commissioner ordered that personal data stored in the U.S.
needed to be transferred to Europe.208 As noted above, in the aftermath
of the decision, Facebook was instructed by the Irish Data
Commissioner to stop sending information to the U.S.209
More recently, in response to the Schrems II decision, the
European Data Protection Board has issued recommendations for
companies seeking to remain in compliance with EU data protection
law.210 These recommendations include advising data exporters to
know what data is being transferred, rely on SCCs, BCRs, or some
equivalent, and ensure that supplementary measures are taken to bring
the level of data protection up to the EU standard.211 While little
guidance is given on what the supplementary measures should entail,
they may have a “contractual, technical or organizational” nature, and
may consist of encrypting all sensitive personal data belonging to EU
data subjects.212
The advice to adopt supplementary measures, however, comes
with the caveat that “[y]ou may . . . find that no supplementary
measure can ensure an essentially equivalent level of protection[.]”213
In such a case, the transfer must be suspended or terminated.214 Taken
in concert with regional and national data protection authorities
comments indicating that data transfers to the United States cannot
meet the essential equivalence standard, the safest step for a company
operating in Europe would be to keep all data in Europe.215
207. Europe: Data Protection Authorities React to Schrems II Judgment, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. Weckler, supra note 169.
210. Recommendations 01/2020 on measures that supplement transfer tools to ensure
compliance with the EU level of protection of personal data, EUR. DATA PROT. BD. 2–3 (Nov.
10,
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_recommendations_202001_supple
mentarymeasurestransferstools_en.pdf.
211. Id. at 2.
212. Id. at 15.
213. Id. at 3.
214. Id. At every stage of the process, the burden is on the company to ensure that BCRs
and SCCs are sufficient.
215. Private data protection associations have already launched a lawsuit against Amazon
for exporting data out of Europe. See, e.g., EU Announces Lawsuit Against Amazon for
Unlawful Data Transfers to the US, DATAGUIDANCE (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.dataguidance.com/news/eu-eugd-announces-lawsuit-against-amazon-unlawfuldata.
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The U.S. State Department216 and Secretary of Commerce217 have
already expressed dissatisfaction with the Schrems II ruling, while
offering little advice to companies seeking to comply. Remarks by the
Secretary of Commerce reflected a commitment to finding an
“enduring solution” but continue to be relatively short on specifics.218
A recent white paper drafted at the behest of the State Department, and
referenced in Ross’ remarks, seeks to allay concerns that businesses
may have regarding the Schrems II opinion. 219 The white paper focuses
on the fact that “the overwhelming majority of companies” including
those involved in the transmittal of “ordinary commercial information
like employee, customer, or sales records” should have no reason to
believe that U.S. intelligence agencies would seek to collect that
data.220 The paper goes on to critique strongly the ECJ’s findings that
U.S. data protections were inadequate, arguing, inter alia, that the
FISC does have adequate oversight over U.S. surveillance agencies
bulk data collection under FISA.221 However, the white paper falls flat
in arguing that there is an adequate remedy for EU data subjects under
U.S. law, relying in particular on Wikimedia Foundation v. National
Security Agency.222 As the paper itself admits, certain data subjects may
lack standing to sue.223
The upshot of these varying remarks is that it remains unclear
what, if anything, U.S. based companies can do to comply with
European data protection law. In light of U.S. surveillance, true
compliance (absent government action) may be impossible,
necessitating a system where no European data subjects’ data is
transferred outside of Europe.224 However, this will have a vast and
disproportionate effect on small and medium sized businesses.225 Even
for larger companies, data balkanization through banning data
216. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, European Ct. of Justice
Invalidates EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (July 17, 2020) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of State).
217. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Sec’y of Com. Wilbur Ross Statement on
Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. Data Flows (July 16, 2020) (on file with
the U.S. Dep’t of Com.).
218. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., Com. Sec’y Wilbur L. Ross at the U.S.-Ireland
Economic Forum Virtual Meeting (Oct. 22, 2020) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Com.).
219. Information on U.S. Privacy Safeguards Relevant to SCCs and Other EU Legal Bases
for EU-U.S. Data Transfers After Schrems II, DEP’T OF COM., DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE DIR.
OF NAT’L INTEL. 1–2 (Sept. 2020), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/202009/SCCsWhitePaperFORMATTEDFINAL508COMPLIANT.PDF.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 13.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 215.
225. See supra note 75.
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transfers is not a realistic short-term solution.226 Sufficient encryption
of data combined with SCCs and the rigorous processes recommended
by the EDPB appears to be the only sufficient short term answer.227
V.

CONCLUSION

If Schrems I set the standard by which all future European
adequacy decisions would be judged, Schrems II serves as a warning:
essential equivalence cannot be met by minor revisions to a treaty.
Given the substantial difference between European and American
conceptions of privacy, substantive legislation, either modeled on the
Japanese example or perhaps a nationwide version of the CCPA seems
to be the only possible long-term solution, and even this would not be
accomplished without years of negotiation and compromise. If the U.S.
and EU were to simply renew Privacy Shield with cosmetic changes,
the ECJ would likely strike it down. And yet, the longer it takes to
construct such a solution, the more uncertainty will be generated by
conflicting statements on both sides of the Atlantic, and the more harm
that will be done to transatlantic data trade, and thus the global
economy. There are no easy answers: indeed, the ECJ provided no
answers at all.

226. For example, abolishing the transatlantic data trade would have massive deleterious
effects on the medical and biomedical research industries, potentially causing substantial
harms to people around the world. See id.
227. See supra note 210.

